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WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
of the holding company was in turn distributed to the stock-
holders of the old corporation. The Court held this a taxable
gain although it was argued that it was a distribution in liquida-
tion, and not a distribution of surplus. However, in Weiss v.
Steam,' where an exchange of stock was made between two cor-
porations, and the stock received by one corporation was dis-
tributed to its stockholders, the Court held the entire arrange-
ment a financial reorganization, which in itself was insufficient
to render the new stock taxable as income to the stockholders.
Mr. Justice Holmes and ir. Justice Brandeis dissented on the
ground that the Court was taking a stand inconsistent with its
former decisions, and it rightly appears so.
In summary it may be said that as a general rule any gain
accruing on the exchange of stock in one company for that of
another will be taxable unless the arrangement was a mere re-
organization of a single going concern.
-AUGUST W. PETROPLUS.
PILADING - MOTION FOR JUDGMENT - QUASI-CONTRACTS. -
In Lambert v. Morton' the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia recently held that the statute providing for the recovery
of money by action on any contract by motion for judgment ap-
plies as well to contracts implied in law (quasi-contracts), as to
express contracts. The case is one of first impression in West
Virginia.
Under equally broad statutory language the Supreme Court
of Appeals of Virginia reached the same conclusion in the case
of Long v. Pence's Committee.' Such a construction is desirable
in view of the object of the statute, which is to simplify and
shorten pleadings and other proceedings, with less chance of a
miscarriage of justice. Another advantage of procedure by mo-
tion is that a plaintiff may so proceed when it is too late to
mature a regular action, or even after the beginning of a term
of court, if it shall continue in session long enough for that pur-
pose.'
8265 U. S. 242, 44 S. Ct. 490, 33 A. L. R. 520 (1924). Contra: Marr v.
United States, 268 U. S. 536, 45 S. Ct. 575 (1925). Four judges dissented
on the ground that the case fell within the rule of Weiss v. Steam.
1160 S. E. 223 (1931).
2W. VA. REv. CODE (1931) c. 56, art. 2, § 6.
8 93 Va. 584, 25 S. E. 593 (1896).
'BURKs, PLEADING AND PRACTICE (2d ed. 1920) e. 20, p. 219 et mq.
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RECENT CASE COMMENTS
It is submitted that this holding may be extended to all
quasi-contractual obligations, and likewise to obligations arising
upon the commission of a tort where such tort gives rise not only
to damage to the person injured, but also to a monetary benefii
to the tort-feasor. Alternative obligations arise--on the one hand
an obligation to pay such damages as the plaintiff has suffered,
and on the other an obligation to pay for such benefits as the de-
fendant has received. If the plaintiff elects to enforce the obliga-
tion to make restitution, and proceeds under the statute in ques-
tion, no violence is done the language of the statute. True there
has been no assent or voluntary assumption of the obligation, but
the whole law of quasi-contract, from the remedial point of view,
depends on the fiction that the defendant has promised to do that
which in justice he ought to do.'
Virginia has found it desirable to extend the scope of the
remedy, until at the present time one may proceed by notice of
motion for judgment in any case, with certain jurisdictional
limitations, where there is a right to maintain an action at law.!
Such provision is a compromise between a system of code plead-
ing, and a system of common law pleading as modified by statutes.
Doubtless we have proponents of each system. If West Virginia
should make this extension the advocates of code procedure will
have full opportunity to develop the merits of the system. If
they prove more satisfactory than the present system the transition
would be much easier than a complete change at one time.'
-DONALD Nt. HUTTON.
PUB3IC UTITIES - IS AN IcE BusrNEss "AFECTED WITH A
PUBLIC INTEREST"? - The plaintiffs were engaged in the manu-
facture and sale of ice in Oklahoma City pursuant to a license
granted according to the statute of Oklahoma.' The defendant
was about to set up a similar business in the same city without
applying to the Corporation Commission for the required certifi-
cate of convenience and necessity.! The plaintiffs sought to en-
join this establishment on the grounds that it is in violation of the
5 WooDw~AR, THE LAw Op QuAsi-CoNTRACxs (1913) c. 19, 20.
:VA. CODE Axx. (1930) § 6046.
SBuRxs, The Code of 1919 (1919) 5 VA. L. REG. (N. S.) 97, 120.
1
=Okla Sesq. Laws 1925, c. 147.
2Ibid, § 2.
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